

COMMISSIONER'S LECTURE SERIES

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

Church Educational System



Socialization,
Self-Deception,
and Freedom
Through Faith

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American
Religion
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#2962

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FOREWORD

COMMISSIONER'S LECTURE SERIES
by Neal A. Maxwell

It is a privilege to present scholars from various academic fields in a lecture series which permits them to draw upon their knowledge and insights in the context of their religious commitments.

The series seeks to achieve several objectives. First, it will provide forums for presentations, the content of which will reflect aspects of the congruence of high-level secular scholarship and spiritual truths.

Second, it will create opportunities for young members of the Church, as well as others, to hear from these high-achieving but orthodox individuals who have made their mark in various fields of scholarship.

All of the participants have my deep gratitude for their "second-mile" willingness to participate in this series, which has involved them with multiple audiences. These participants represent a large body of scholars of similar quality and with similar commitment to the gospel of Jesus Christ. It is fortunate that we can have the words and writings of at least a few.

*For biographical information, see the following page.

C. Terry Warner, Associate Professor of Philosophy and former chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Brigham Young University, has achieved an impressive number of accomplishments since 1963 when he was designated Graduate with Highest Honors in the Honors Program at BYU.

In 1963 he received both the Danforth and the Woodrow Wilson graduate fellowships; in 1966 he was presented the highest award given by Yale University to a graduate student: the Sterling Fellowship; in 1967 he took his Ph.D. in Philosophy at Yale University; in 1968 he was named BYU Professor of the Year; and in 1971 he was listed among the Outstanding Young Men of America.

At thirty-seven, Dr. Warner currently serves as dean of the College of General Studies and director of the Honors Program at BYU.

His service in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has included a mission to Great Britain in 1957-59 (where he was also associate editor of the *Millennial Star*); bishop of the New Haven, Connecticut, ward of the Church; a member of the Church's Teacher Development Committee; and currently, branch president of BYU 41st Branch of the Church.

Professor Warner has written a textbook on logic and has presented papers at professional meetings.

He and his wife, the former Susan Lillywhite of Anaheim, California, have six children.

This paper was prepared for the Commissioner's Lecture Series, Church Educational System, and was delivered in 1973 at the LDS Institutes of Religion at the University of Utah and at Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Socialization, Self-Deception, and Freedom Through Faith

Imagine a human being who grew up deprived of any contact with other individuals, either mortal or immortal. What would he be like? It is obvious that he could neither speak nor understand a language. He could not act in ways which presuppose the learning of standards of conduct. Some have even pointed out that without language and without standards of behavior there is a sense in which he would not be a full-fledged person. Deprived of the socialization process, he would in all likelihood behave much as an animal behaves (though perhaps a particularly clever animal) in spite of the fact that there was an eternal spirit in him. (The story of Helen Keller's girlhood, prior to the time at which the notion of language symbols dawned upon her, indicates vividly what such an individual might be like.)

When we think of this sort of human being, the socialization process seems clearly to be a good thing. But in most situations it is not an unmixed blessing by any means, for this process which is essential to our becoming full personalities can, in a fallen society, also be the very vehicle by which Satan corrupts us and brings us sorrows. In this lecture, I would like to characterize some aspects of this corruption and these sorrows and to indicate why the gospel provides the only genuine alternative to them: it is both their only prevention and their only cure.

In all of this, please know that I am aware that I cannot claim any answers to gospel questions; such answers must be revealed. The best I can offer are some questions to gospel answers, in the hope that by comprehending something of the seriousness of man's predicament without the gospel we may come to appreciate a little more how and why it offers the only possible solution to our problems.

I. Socialization and a Subtle Form of Servitude

I would like now to characterize (somewhat abstractly) the socialization process by which the

community participates in the development of our personalities and which can lead to such problems as hypocrisy, self-deception, deadening of feeling, contrivance of personality, diminishment of self-control, and estrangement from others, including God. To do this I shall introduce considerations which may seem at first to take us away from our subject; I ask your indulgence, for they are essential to my purpose.

Familiar objects and social purposes

Consider how we learn to identify, classify, respond to, and deal with the things in our world, such as ordinary tables. Tables are physical objects. It has been almost universally assumed that we define and identify these objects on the basis of their physical (strictly observable) properties alone—their shape, size, color, dimensions. But the objects which can properly be called “tables” do not have a single set of physical properties in common so that they can be distinguished from other kinds of objects by possession of these properties. There is no size, weight, texture, material, or proportion which all tables share. Though most of them happen to have legs, it is not necessary that they do: a table can stick out from a wall. Nor does a table need to have a horizontal surface; you can imagine a table with an inclined and magnetized top which could serve perfectly well for certain purposes. (Think what a table might be like in a luxury space ship of the future.) What tables in fact have in common is not a set of physical properties but instead a susceptibility to be put to certain kinds of uses by human beings. The physical properties of an object must be suited to such uses if it is to be a table, but these properties do not make it a table.¹ It is human purposes that make it a table.

¹The list of physical configurations of an object which would make it susceptible to the kind of use to which tables are put is indefinitely long; it is for this reason that we can neither define nor identify tables wholly in terms of such properties.

Values and Facts

All of this means that as a child learns how to use the word "table" and how to respond to and deal with tables, he is not merely learning *facts* about the physical nature of his world. He is also learning *values*. He is learning something about the purposes his society allows and prohibits and how things may be classified as useful or unuseful (valuable or not valuable) for those purposes. In the large majority of cases which matter to us, the facts we learn about things include the values we assign to those things; the facts are, as it were, "value-laden." (People who design our school curricula often think otherwise, but they are wrong.) In sum, the standards of correctness against which one measures his own attempts to use the word "table" and to employ certain kinds of objects as tables are not found exclusively in the strictly observable properties of these objects; these standards are instead found in the general purposes and valuations of the people in his community.

Seeing, responding, and fulfilling others' expectations

Thus, when an individual learns about tables, pencils, churches, spoons, houses, household plants, brothers and sisters, clothing, and so on, he is learning (among other things) ways in which others expect him to value, to use, and to respond to these things: he sets out in the enterprise of becoming a person to fulfill the expectations of other people, expectations which are by no means natively his own. Both he and others gauge the correctness, appropriateness, and accuracy of his perceptions and behavior by what the others would corroborate.

This unavoidable situation is not necessarily a bad thing. It harms the child only when people insidiously demand that he fulfill these expectations as a condition of their acceptance and approval of him. When this happens (and it happens most of the time) the child is, from his earliest years, involved not only in behaving according to norms and standards which he has learned from others (this is a necessary condition of all behavior), but also in using this behavior to win their approval. The community which accepts the child only conditionally thus breeds into him insecurity about who he is and whether he is justified in being who he is. Approval is held out as relief from this insecurity. By this demonic means, pervasive in our society, he is subtly controlled.

II. Control by the Collective

It is a commonplace that how a person sees his world and acts toward it is at least partly dependent upon what he thinks of himself, and that the way he thinks of himself is in turn dependent upon how he thinks others think of him. What we have established thus far is an even more deep-cutting thesis, namely, that an individual's ways of seeing and acting toward the things and people around him are grounded in the way other people perceive and act not just toward him, but also toward those things and people. Thus it is partly through the objects that surround him that others subtly influence him and even, if they are impure, exercise control over him, tacitly demanding that he perceive and behave as they do in order to have their approval. He may suppose himself independent in the way he looks upon his world and seeks to satisfy his desires, but there is an important sense in which he is their slave.

It is difficult to describe examples of this phenomenon among the youngest children, even though the earliest phases of the socialization process have already begun in them; for they cannot tell us about it. By the time these children get to elementary school, however, their teachers constantly encounter instances of almost neurotic compulsion to win approval, to be recognized, to belong—in short, to establish themselves as viable social entities.

Once again, in order to learn to act at all, a child must learn to do "what is done" in his community. And when that community is itself made up of insecure people—people who demand certain kinds of responses, even from children, in order to confirm their deeply desperate hopes about themselves—then the child's learning to do what is done by others becomes the price he must pay for being acknowledged a full-fledged person. The canonized will of the collective is then the law of Moses all over again, only this time it is insidious; for besides being without divine sanction, it is brought to bear upon the child in the particularly irresistible form which I have described. The child has no leverage against it: it is impossible for him to alter at will the ways in which he sees and deals with the objects in his world. Therefore, it is impossible for him to respond to his world independently of others' responses to it and to him. His perception of their responses thus becomes the very medium in which he moves, like the air he breathes.

The collective does not precisely say to him, “Not thy will but ours be done.” Instead it says, in effect, “You have no will apart from ours. We have taught you how to see and what is valuable and not valuable. We have taught you, indeed, what will satisfy you. We have taught you, through our incomparably orchestrated responses to you and to the world upon which you look, what you shall be pleased with. You are permitted to believe that your reason for being satisfied with our approved pleasures is that they are pleasurable and not that we approved them, but you are our creature for all of that. Consider: you come home from work and blow up at the children. You want peace and quiet. You want to watch TV or drink with the boys or work in your shop. You believe that you find satisfaction in these activities and that accordingly the children are standing in your way. It is one essential part of our control over you that you do not realize that your actual motivation for watching TV or drinking or working in the shop on such occasions is inextricably bound up with your hope of obtaining approval from us—or from yourself, which we have made into one and the same thing by teaching you to see the world and yourself through our eyes.”

A black writer wrote the following about the American Negro in 1903 (there are hundreds of such passages in the minorities literature of the past half-century, from Jean Genet to Betty Frieden):

... the Negro is ... born with a veil and gifted with second-sight in this American world—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body. . . .

I am suggesting that this same thing is true for the vast majority of those who live in our culture, except that it is probably even more subtle for the non-minority person, because it is harder to diagnose and harder to cure.

The pervasiveness of control by others

In *The Republic* Plato has Glaucon recount the myth of Gyges' Ring. It seems that Gyges, the legendary shepherd, found a gold ring on a dead body in an earthquake-created chasm. One day in the presence of companions he discovered to his surprise that if he rubbed the bezel of the ring he became invisible. By fingering the ring again he became visible once more. The procedure always worked. He managed to get himself sent to court as a messenger where by using the ring he got into the queen's chambers, seduced her, and with her help killed the king and seized the throne.

Glaucon argued that a so-called “just” man with such a ring (and, therefore, with such power) would behave precisely as the so-called “unjust” man. According to Glaucon, men do right only when they are compelled to—when they will be punished if they do not.

We can make this myth especially interesting by imagining that the ring made Gyges permanently invisible. If he seduced the queen, murdered the king, seized the throne, acquired total political power, and amassed riches, no one would ever perceive that he had. No one would respond in one way or the other to his victories. Would there be any pleasure in his having possessions then? In seducing the queen? In exercising power? Think about it. Wouldn't he tend to lose all motivation for action? (Those who did continue to act energetically after realizing that no one would ever find out would, I submit, do either purely good or purely evil things: their intentions would not become complicated and compromised by the desire to elicit certain kinds of responses from others.) For most of us in such a situation, all motivation would dissipate. If this is true it is an indication that we are by and large impaled on the unspoken regulative demands which other people make upon us.

Why control by others is destructive

It is not obvious to everyone that the control process which I have described is evil. Some simply accept it as unavoidable. Others endorse it because they are busy using it to their own advantage, replicating their kind in younger generations in order to persuade themselves that what the process has made of them is acceptable. Still others—Mao Tse-tung and B. F. Skinner, for example—want to manipulate the process itself according to a “rational” plan, supposing that even freedom (and many doubt

whether this really exists) is not to be valued as highly as the production of personality according to a rational model. Control by the collective is destructive for at least two reasons, both having to do with the fact that there is a spirit in man—a spirit with desires which have been developed in another, freer setting and which are incompatible with any values endorsed in unrighteous communities. First: it is precisely this fact that explains why, no matter how thoroughly approved by his community, a person without God characteristically feels unarticulated dissatisfactions and discontents with what that community provides for him. His eternal desires will remain stifled until he hears and responds to the gospel, and will have satisfaction only to the degree that the portion of the gospel he espouses approximates what his soul has unspeakingly yearned for since his birth.

Second: no matter what planning goes into the socialization process, the child produced therein always lives under a Damoclean sword which prevents him from ever being wholly secure: “Be like us,” he is in effect instructed, “or we will reject you.” Nothing—not even his place in the community—would be his by right. In a perfectly righteous family or community, on the other hand, the child would be totally accepted because he (like the others) is a child of God. He would have his place by right—by absolute right; there would be no need for him to earn a place by pleasing other people. This is one reason why membership in the Church is essential to happiness; in it we see ourselves, or should see ourselves, as one another’s brothers and sisters in the family of God. When we do this there can be no personal purposes in the way we respond to people and the expectations we impose upon them. Leadership in families and ecclesiastical units is also conducted on similar principles: the leader—the father or bishop—sacrifices everything for those whom he serves, and therefore is able to impose expectations and discipline upon them without being perceived as disapproving them. He wants them to be their best selves—not selves that could profit him in some way.

“The approval principle”

Since Freud there has been a popular tendency to suppose that the pleasure-pain principle is basic in explaining why people act as they do; in the light of what has been said so far, we might well wonder whether the approval-disapproval principle is not equally fundamental. For in the socialization process in which the latter principle plays an overwhelmingly

important role, pain and pleasure quickly become distorted; it even becomes very difficult to sort out which is which. Defiance, bickering, asceticism, masochism, and other such phenomena cannot be accounted for in terms of pain and pleasure alone. What men seem to need as much as anything else is to become approved elements in society and thereby to confirm their desperate hope that they are right. In short, they need to obtain a good judgment. Should it surprise us that in trying to appear to be right and approved we live in constant anticipation of the Judgment—or better, in constant anticipatory exercise of the Judgment? Even though most men do not acknowledge overtly that there is a final accounting to be given for their lives, perhaps they acknowledge this constantly and covertly by coaxing reinforcing responses from others in order to persuade themselves that when the time comes they will obtain such an accounting.

III. Socialization and Self-deception

Socialization and duplicity

When a person tries by his actions to get people to respond to him in certain ways, he cannot avoid being duplicitous; that is to say, he cannot avoid trying to do two things at once, one of which he wants to hide even from himself. He not only does what he desires others to perceive him as doing; he also does something else besides—he tries to get them to so perceive him. Consider for example the philanthropist who is trying to make certain that others see him as a philanthropist: he not only gives money to the poor but also attempts to have others see him as philanthropic. James called such a man “double minded” (James 1:8); and he implied that the heart of a double-minded man is necessarily impure. Even the man who tries to arrange himself not in the minds of other observers but only in his own mind as he plays the role of self-observer is in this predicament; he is guilty of letting the “left hand know what [the] right hand doeth.” (Matthew 6:3.) And he is incapable, in such undertakings, of acting simply, straightforwardly, uncalculatingly, guilelessly. His eye cannot be single to the glory of God, because in doing what may appear to be good he is always surreptitiously concerned about what other people are thinking of him.

Self-deception

The duplicitous person—the victim of the socialization process in an impure community—cannot know

himself. Consider the philanthropist—or, for that matter, the boy who sets out to win athletic accolades or the girl concerned with eliciting favorable responses from men. What these people are really doing is trying to secure a certain description of themselves in other people's minds; they are trying to arrange the way they will appear to people. The philanthropist chooses public giving as his means for doing this; the athlete, physical competition; the girl, fashion and flirtation. It is impossible for any of the three to acknowledge to himself what he is actually trying to accomplish by these means. For what he is actually trying to accomplish is to win approval; but if, watching himself act, he sees himself as he really is, as trying to win approval, then he cannot approve of himself. For seeking to win approval is not something of which he can approve (it is giving or winning or attracting others that he approves). The result is that the would-be philanthropist or victor or siren has to hide part of himself from himself and from others behind the appearances he is trying to create in order to continue to try to create those appearances. Duplicity sets up a condition in which self-knowledge is impossible.

When a person represses what he really believes in this way, we say he is in self-deception. I think that most people in the world, victims of a manipulative socialization experience, are both duplicitous and self-deceived. And I think it is one of the glories of the gospel that it offers to men the only program by which their hearts can be purified, their fears can be put to rest, and the inner workings of their hearts can be perfectly known to them.

The inability of the self-deceived person to know what he wants

We have seen that when one is fulfilling other people's expectations, he is not doing what he presents himself as doing. This is even true of those who protest most that they know what they are trying to get out of life; for example, pleasure-seekers. They tell themselves that they are independent of social conventions and mores, or that they are rebellious, or that they are free. As much as anything else, they are trying to make a point to others or to themselves with their behavior; they are trying to establish that they are pleasure-seekers. It is not simply satisfaction in an act that they are seeking, therefore, but satisfaction in the idea of the act. That is to say, they are seeking satisfaction in the appearance of seeking satisfaction in the act. This explains why such people

do not find satisfaction when they accomplish the act: it is not what they wanted. And what they wanted, an appearance of so acting, cannot satisfy them either, for it is a pretense and must be perpetually maintained; it is not something which is ever finally realized. It is for these reasons that a person who grows up in an impure society can never have true satisfaction but can only sustain himself by the perpetual hope of satisfaction.

The divisiveness of self-deception

It is easy to see that when a person is subtly controlled by others' expectations and so seeks by his actions to manage the way he will appear to be acting, there are schisms created between what is known and what appears. For example, a separation is created between what he really is and what he appears to be. If others too are victims of the socialization process in a fallen community, there is also a separation between the way in which they are trying to appear to be responding and the way in which they are actually responding. Thus, there is in general a separation between the public selves of all concerned and their private selves. We live in an age which believes in the myth that the distinction between the public self and the private self is a necessary truth about all men everywhere. I believe, on the contrary, that this distinction and the solipsism, separateness, aloneness, and apparently impenetrable privacy which are associated with it are not conditions essential to men living together in society but rather are created by self-deceiving men who demand self-deceiving responses from others.

The deadening of feeling

In an impure society, growing up implies a progressive deadening of feeling. The gradually maturing agent loses the capacity to respond uncontrivedly and undefensively in situations. His overriding concern must be with how he appears to be feeling. What Jean-Paul Sartre called "the look of the Other" has insidiously encroached upon his own perspective. He is left without any independent standpoint for evaluating himself, a standpoint from which he can say, "This is how *I* feel. This is what *I* see." He cannot approve or condemn himself because to acknowledge what he really is and what his real self has done to others would cause the artifice of his world and his personality, which has been gradually arranged in the minds of people, including his own, to crumble. Therefore, the feelings that would accompany these

insights are out of reach. Justice is out of reach: he cannot be honest about what he is. Sorrow unto repentance is out of reach: he cannot condemn himself because he cannot be just. Joy unto exaltation is out of reach: the broken heart which must precede it entails a fulness of feeling of which he is incapable.

The contrived personality

The person I have been describing contrives his personality; he becomes a standardized—that is, conventionalized—thing. Everyone has witnessed a child's tender, guileless response patterns give way to affected ways of acting and talking, so that in the course of time his real self becomes all but inaccessible, even to him. In seeking not merely to act but also to arrange the way he will appear to act, he loses spontaneity; others with any discernment say that he is not a completely "genuine" person. His agency is used to make him the slave of convention; he is a willful prisoner. His creativity and his agency are employed to yield control and responsibility for his behavior to other people. In short, he puts his agency in the service of an alien will, the will of the collective.

IV. Faith and Futurity

We have seen that in a fallen community the very conditions and processes which enable an individual to become a person corrupt the development of his personality. And because self-deceived people raise children to sustain their own self-deceptions, the children too are victimized and, in turn, perpetrate the calamity upon their peers and their own children. The result is a community of isolated and grotesquely private selves whose bodies interact but who by and large do not know (much less love) one another. This bleak account might seem strikingly like a partial definition of hell itself.

*Why faith in God is the only way of escape from self-deception*²

The solution lies in the individual's learning to act

²It has been recommended by some so-called "existentialist" thinkers that the socially bestowed meanings of the objects and people in our milieu be stripped away, for, as fictions, they are both delusionary and restrictive of freedom. To the extent that the world thus becomes meaningless (either actually, as in Nietzsche's life, or fictionally, as in Sartre's *La Nausée*), the individual is beset by intolerable anxiety—with no reference points any longer, he is disoriented, he drifts, he suffers from seasickness of soul. Only if there is a wholly trustworthy ground of meaning to replace the delusionary one can equilibrium be secured.

without concern for how he will appear (even to himself) to act: his deliberations about a possible course of action must not be swayed by whether it will lead to consequences which are favorable for him; he must consider only whether it is right. If his plans are influenced by consideration of his own advantage, he is committed to taking his destiny in his own hands, rather than leaving it in the hands of God. He is concerned with more than whether his motives are pure: he wants, irrespective of the purity of those motives, to make sure that he benefits from what he does. (He is willing to reap where he has not sown.) For example, the almsgiver who is thus double-minded not only makes his offering but also strives thereafter to insure that that offering bears certain fruits (e.g., other men's acknowledgment of it). It is clear that such a man is never at complete peace with himself: he must bustle about making certain that his treasure—what other people think—is secure.

You may remain unconvinced by this thesis that the "double minded man is unstable in all his ways." (James 1:8.) You may still suppose that by calculating carefully enough you can milk your deeds for all you want while yet satisfying every reasonable expectation the Lord can make of you. If so, consider this. To plan your act is to envision how you want the future to be changed; to plan for your own advantage is to include in that envisioned future an image of yourself. It is to imagine how you will cause yourself to appear (to others and to yourself) in that future. And this means that from the planning stages of the act onward, you are watching yourself. The perspective from which you observe is that of your society (for you cherish your anticipated advantage, be it remembered, because you think that others do). Already are you in the position of hiding from yourself what you are doing, since, as we have seen, it is not advantageous to acknowledge that you are being servile. Already are you deceiving yourself.

But there is more. When you try to conform your action to the image of yourself and the future, *you can only create an appearance*. Try as you will, it is not in your power to make yourself *be* as you would appear to be. When you attempt, with an eye single to righteousness, to help another, you are charitable; but when you attempt to be charitable, you are double-minded, for you are self-concerned (about being charitable) as well as other-concerned. Consequently you are not wholly charitable, however convincing your contrived appearance of charity may be to other self-deceiving people. Said the Savior,

“Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?” (Matthew 6:27.) What you become is ever beyond your control—the natural result of what you do that is always and in principle just out of reach, like the head of a child’s shadow as he tries to jump on it.

I am far from the first to point this out. It is a principle, not always well understood, which graces several religions. To take one example: Krishna warns repeatedly in the *Bhagavad-Gita* not to let “desire for the fruits of your work . . . be your motive in working.”

*The seers say truly
That he is wise
Who acts without lusting or scheming
For the fruit of the act. . . .*

*He calls nothing his own:
He acts, and earns no evil.*

*What God’s will gives
He takes, and is contented. . . .*³

Either a person will be contented with the consequences of what he does, trusting wholly in the Being who controls all outcomes, or he will not. If he will not, his faith is deficient: he will try to do for himself what he does not believe the Lord will do for him; he will take his destiny into his own hands. It may well be in this sense that we are counseled to “take . . . no thought for the morrow” (Matthew 6:34), and to plunge without reserve, trusting the future to the Lord, into the work of today. “For us there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.”⁴

There is a connection, then, between the single-mindedness of faith and the means by which double-minded self-deception can be overcome. The means is the agent’s trust that the outcome of his faithful act will always be for the best. I believe that this trust can be sustained only in Christ. I am not saying that men cannot help one another develop this trust: a man in a white robe met Lehi at an early stage of his spiritual exodus and led him through mists of darkness. But I am saying that without confidence in a benevolent Deity’s cosmic management of things, we

must (if we are concerned about how things will turn out for our and our brethren’s sakes) take the management of the future into our own hands—and risk the temporal damnation which I am calling self-deception.

Four points concern my claim that the Savior is the key to escape from self-deception:

1. Only if we feel we are obtaining an accurate judgment of our conduct can we confidently abandon the desperate task of trying to obtain a good one at any cost by manipulating other people’s perception of us.

2. If we are to be liberated from the perceptual and behavioral servitude to others which I have described, we must encounter at least one significant other so pure in his own motivations—so undeceived—that his responses to us will reveal to us the truth about ourselves. Without such truth, we have no leverage against the tyranny of others’ expectations: we cannot assess what is wrong with us: we cannot, in short, discover that we have been self-deceived. Some are lucky enough to live with such significant others in their families; some encounter them in church. For everyone, however, it is prayer that provides the best opportunity for receiving honest feedback, for the monitor or respondent whom one encounters in prayer is outside of the circle of human observers around him, and perfectly discerning and pure. Therefore, the child who learns to pray never needs to become self-alienated because of the expectations of his community, for in prayer he belongs to another community (which at a minimum includes the Savior) whose expectations do not victimize him. These expectations and the responses through which they are revealed not only teach us about ourselves; they also can liberate us from servitude to others’ selfish, manipulative purposes. The reason is that those who extend these expectations have no such purposes; they *want* to set us free. They desire for us no ideals uncongenial to our highest ideals for ourselves, and this suggests why the judgment of the Savior and of his servants (to the degree that they are righteous) is the only judgment concerning us which is our self-judgment also.

3. Only if the treasure of one’s heart consists of eternal and indestructible things can he believe that an accurate judgment will not cause him to lose what he loves. What the world’s people have to give to him, they give on the basis of the appearances which he creates which will serve them in some way. If what they have to give is what he treasures, then their judg-

³S. Prabhavanada and C. Isherwood, trans., *Bhagavad-Gita, or Song of God* (Hollywood, 1944), pp. 46, 64.

⁴T. S. Eliot, “East Coker,” in *Four Quartets*, line 189.

ment of him will control him and he will be in self-deception.

The man whose treasure is laid up in heaven knows that he will lose nothing by not trying to arrange himself in the minds of other people. What may appear to be the loss of a self is only the loss of a contrivance of a self; in actuality, he gains his real self for the first time without seeking directly to do so, but in the course of seeking to bring about good in the world according to the Savior's precepts. He lays down a life composed of roughly equal parts of desperation and pretense and enjoys when he does a quality of living far better than any achievable by taking thought. "Let no man be afraid to lay down his life for my sake; for whoso layeth down his life for my sake shall find it again." (D&C 103:27.)

4. People who have taken their destiny into their own hands—people who are "without God in the world"—characteristically try to hang on to their contrived lives at any cost. Frequently they even make elaborate pretense of loving such lives. They assert in their actions that they are in perfect self-control, enjoy moral independence, and have accurate self-knowledge. Of course these attributes are precisely what they, being self-deceived, lack. They desperately want to conceive of themselves as having them because this is their way of compensating for lacking them.

In this context, one of the most impressive aspects of the life of Joseph Smith is the connection between (a) his willingness to acknowledge the Savior as the controller, sovereign, and knower of his soul and (b) his capacity to live spontaneously, honestly, abun-

dantly, and responsively. It was precisely because he had given up his life to a will higher than his own—he knew far in advance of his death that it would come upon him at an early season—that he was able to conduct himself so openly. He arrogated to himself nothing; he made no attempt (in his maturity, at least) to manipulate his own destiny; he constantly and without sense of loss (except for his friends from whom he would be temporarily parted) confronted his own death and with a consequent authenticity of feeling which was unclouded by any form of self-deception knew what it meant to have expansive enjoyments in this life. As I have said on another occasion, there seems to be an inverse variation between satisfaction pursued and satisfaction obtained; only those have an abundant life who do not suppose that they can create such a life out of their own resources.

We can be genuinely free, independent, and self-knowing only when we regard our persons as stewardships which belong to God and manage them on the principle of stewardship. Then instead of trying to win approval for our doings we will find, if we persist in trying to do what is right, that what we do turns out to be approved. We will discover at unexpected points, in solitary reflection and through the instrumentality of the Spirit, the approbation of God upon our efforts and will know ourselves lucidly in this same way. Said George McDonald, "The one principle of hell is—'I am on my own.' " And it is a principle of heaven to conceive ourselves as belonging to the Lord. "What? know ye not that . . . ye are not your own? For ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's." (1 Corinthians 6:19-20.)

